LESSON 9

Self-Inspection

In our course *Essentials of Industrial Security Management* (*EISM*), we discussed the aperiodic government review of contractor facilities and went over how a self-inspection may be conducted at a facility that does not possess classified information. In this lesson we'll talk about self-inspection at a facility that possesses SECRET information, then see how Harold Huxtable conducts a self-inspection at EWC. Harold will not, however, be going over the elements that were addressed in *EISM*. Instead, he will focus on those elements we've been looking at in the lessons so far.

OBJECTIVES

When you have finished this lesson, you should be able to do the following:

- State what determines when self-inspections of a facility should be conducted.
- Determine the elements that a self-inspection of a possessing facility might cover.
- Identify desirable features of a self-inspection.

WHY SELF- INSPECTIONS?

Under the Security Agreement it's up to the contractor "to provide and maintain a system of security controls within the organization" that accord with the guidance in the NISPOM. In practice this comes down to you, as FSO, being on top of the security program at your facility. If, like many FSOs, your job includes handling other matters in addition to security, it's all too easy for these other matters to fill up your time. The required self-inspection is one means of assuring that you have the opportunity to take a good hard look at your *entire security program*. It is also an excellent opportunity to conduct one-on-one security education with your employees.

If your firm is performing on several classified contracts, you may want to conduct your self-inspection along *program specific* lines. This approach entails focusing on a single classified program and interviewing its key personnel. By taking an in-depth look at every relevant element of security in a single program you can gauge how well classified information is being safeguarded throughout your facility.

However you decide to proceed, remember that your goal is to ensure that classified information is properly protected at your facility by employees who know and carry out their security responsibilities.

This occasional scrutiny is no substitute for your ongoing day-to-day attention to security though, and handling security situations properly as they come up is the best way to ensure that all reviews of your facility's security program, whether made by you or by the DSS Field Office, confirm that the classified information entrusted to your facility is in good hands.

USING THE SELF-INSPECTION HANDBOOK.

You must conduct your self-inspections "at intervals consistent with risk management principles." In determining when to conduct it, we suggest that you weigh the recency and results of past government reviews and your contacts with your I.S. Rep, as well as any significant changes or questionable events or circumstances regarding the security program that have come to your attention.

The Department of Defense Security Service (DSS) has provided contractors the Self-Inspection Handbook in Number 1-95 of the Security Awareness Bulletin. This issue is available from your Field Office. The Self-Inspection Handbook covers the entire range of contractor involvement in the DoD implementation of NISP and serves as a guide for conducting self-inspections.

It is unlikely that all of the elements of security listed in the handbook will apply to your facility. How do you know which ones to key in on? We suggest that you consider focusing on about a dozen elements. Sections A (Facility Clearance), B (Access Authorizations), and C (Security Education) would apply to any facility, possessing or non-possessing.

The core elements for a possessing facility would also include F (Visit Control), G (Classification), K (Classified Storage), M (Transmission), N (Classified Material Controls), P (Disposition), and Q (Reproduction). For a facility that generates classified information, Section L

(Markings) would also be an important element. Depending on the operations of the facility and the activities of its personnel, other elements, such as H (Employee Identification), I (Foreign Ownership, Control, and Influence), J (Public Release), or 0 (Controlled Access Areas), might also apply.

The best way to use the Self-Inspection Handbook is to go down the list and ask yourself those questions which apply to your situation as well as the logical follow-ups to those questions. And don't just go down the list at your desk; if the question concerns the Security Agreement, locate the agreement.

But like your I.S. Rep, you should do more than a mere paper check. It is the entire security system you are interested in, not just the related paperwork. Get out into the facility and observe how classified information is being handled and stored. Talk to the employees (you should be doing this on a regular basis anyway). This needn't be a formal interrogation - a friendly chat will suffice, if it gives you the information you're after.

ANALYZE AND CORRECT

When you've finished your self-inspection, what then? Obviously, you should correct any problems you came across. And don't just leave it at that. Take a good look at *what caused the problem*. Was it a single, isolated incident or was it a symptom of a flaw in the security program itself? If you have an SPP and your analysis shows that procedures in it are inadequate or ineffective, revise them. If you need help, your I.S. Rep will be glad to assist you.

The whole idea of the self-inspection is to give you, the FSO, a chance to review your overall security program by examining its elements and aspects. Your review should ensure that your facility's overall security posture is adequate.

AN EXAMPLE OF A SELF-INSPECTION

On the following pages we have provided an example of a self-inspection conducted by Harold Huxtable, EWC's FSO. It is not an all-inclusive self-inspection. As we join Harold, he has already gone through elements A through E of the Self-Inspection Handbook; we covered elements A through D in **EISM**, and element E does not apply to EWC since it does no subcontracting.

SELF-INSPECTION AT EWC

Next came

- F. Visit Control.
- 1. Can the contractor determine that all classified visits require access to or disclosure of classified information?

Lin Crigger had been EWC's only classified visitor lately. One visitor was minimal in anybody's book. And the need for coordination between EWC and ACME Aeronautics justified the visit.

Harold moved on to

2. Does notification of classified visits allow sufficient lead time for the receiver's timely approval?

Since CDR Eckles had approved the visit before the VAL was sent, there was no question of sufficient lead time.

3. Do VAL's include the required information and are they updated to reflect changes in the status of that information?

Harold vividly recalled sending the VAL to NESC for Buzz's planned visit. He was about to ask Zelda for EWC's copy of the VAL. But when he looked up from the NISPOM, Zelda was handing the facsimile sheet up to him. "Looking for this?" she asked.

"Why, uh, yes, I was. How did ... Thanks."

Harold ensured that the VAL contained all of the required items of information.

Harold had notified CDR Eckles of the substitution of Bascom for Buzz, and, if need be, CDR Eckles would confirm the notification. Check.

4. Are procedures established to ensure positive identification of visitors prior to disclosure of classified?

Harold went downstairs to the reception area to see Becky Womble, EWC's receptionist. "When Mr. Crigger visited us a few days ago, what kind of identification did he show you, Becky?"

Becky thought for a moment and said, "His driver's license and his ACME photo I.D. His ACME photo was much more like him than the one on his license. All that license photo lacked was a long number under his chin!"

"Thanks, Becky."




5. Are procedures established to ensure that visitors are only afforded classified information consistent with their visit?

Though the NISPOM did not require it, Harold had taken Lin Crigger to Buzz and Buzz had taken him to the front door after the visit. From conversations with Buzz and Zelda the day after the visit, Harold was sure that Lin had not taken any of EWC's classified material with him.

On to

6. Does the facility Visitor Record include the required information?



"Here's the VAL with the date of his visit noted on the back. The Navy GCA's approval for the disclosure of its classified information is attached to the VAL."

"Thanks, Zelda."

8. Has the contractor secured the approval of the relevant GCA prior to disclosure of classified during non-contract related visits?

Zelda had just shown him the approval.

On to



G. Classification.

1 . Is all classification guidance adequate and is the *Contract Security Classification Specification* provided as required?

Harold thought the narrative on the DD Form 254 for the Laser Widget Project was adequate but decided to double-check with Buzz. It was nearly a week since Buzz's accident and he had been back at work for a few days now. He wore a sling for his right arm, but he had rigged up a device that allowed him to write and draw with some comfort.

"How's the arm, Buzz?"

"About as good as a pin-sweeper in a bowling alley. What's up?"



"Self-inspection. I'm on 'classification.' Are you having any problems using the DD Form 254?"

"Well, I have to read between the lines now and then, but no real problems," Buzz said.

How're the classification levels?"

"Fine. Fine. No problem."

'O.K. Say, when does the bandage come off?"

11 Never, I hope. Old Man Wilbersnoot heard about what happened. Zelda said his eyes lit up when he heard about the scars. He's up to something. You can bet on it."

"Old Man Wilbersnoot" was J. Digby Wilbersnoot, Chairman of the Board and President of EWC. Harold reported directly to him.

"You have my sympathy," Harold told Buzz as he left.

Let's see now, thought Harold. Classification guidance is O.K.

2. Does the GCA issue revised classification specifications as needed?

None had been needed, as yet anyway.

3. Does the contractor have adequate procedures for applying derivative classification to classified material being created, extracted or summarized?

EWC's procedure was simple but effective. Harold reviewed the markings on everything Buzz generated to ensure that they were accurate and complete,

4. Is improper or inadequate classification guidance challenged?

EWC didn't need to challenge the guidance since it seemed fine.

5. Upon completion of a classified contract does the contractor properly dispose of the relevant classified information?

EWC had yet to complete its classified contract, but when they did Harold was confident that he could dispose of any classified information related to it in accordance with the NISPOM and GCA requirements.

6. Is contractor-developed information appropriately classified, marked and protected?

Harold's policy is that he must first approve any unsolicited proposal before it can be submitted to ensure that it is classified and marked according to the pertinent DD Form 254, Classification Guide, or source material. He would submit any information not previously classified to the appropriate GCA for a determination.


7. Are downgrading and declassification actions accomplished as required?

Harold considered. EWC had not failed to downgrade or declassify any document as required.

Element **H. Employee Identification** was for facilities that used I.D. cards and badges. EWC had too few cleared employees now to bother with either. And **1. Foreign Travel** did not apply either. No one at EWC had gone farther away than Buzz on his trip to Site B, well within New York State.

J. Public Release did not apply to EWC either. Harold had seen the EWC Annual Report and it had contained nothing about the Laser Widget Project except that EWC had been awarded the contract, that is was a negotiated contract, and the total dollar amount of the contract. Harley Sanders had told Harold it was alright to publish the information in the annual report.

On to



K. Classified Storage.

1. Has the contractor established a system of security checks at the end of each working day to ensure that classified material is secured?

Yes. Zelda always checked to see that all classified material was stored in the GSA-approved cabinet, then locked the cabinet. Harold double-checked that all classified material was secured.

2. Does the contractor maintain a system of perimeter controls to deter or detect unauthorized introduction or removal of classified from the facility?

Yes. Harley Sanders and Harold had established an excellent spot check system.

3. Are procedures developed for the safeguarding of classified material during an emergency?

Yes. Harold had worked with Harley to develop the procedures, which were recorded in EWC's Standard Practice Procedures.

4. Is the number of persons possessing knowledge of the combinations to security containers minimized?

Yes. Just two persons knew the combination. Zelda and he.

5. Is a record of the names of persons having knowledge of the combinations to security containers maintained?

Yes. The record in the container showed his and Zelda's names and, though not required, their home telephone numbers.

6. Are security containers, vaults, cabinets, and other authorized storage containers kept locked when not under direct of an authorized person?

Yes. Zelda always kept her GSA-approved cabinet locked when she wasn't looking after it.

7. When combinations to security containers holding classified are placed in written form, are they marked and stored as required?

EWC never wrote down the combination to its container. Its current unrecorded "code word" was "BAFFLE" (2233-53).

8. Are combinations to security containers changed by authorized persons when required?

Yes. Usually by Zelda. As needed.

Harold skipped items 9 through 21 since they did not apply to EWC's situation.

Next came

L. Markings.

1. Is all classified material, regardless of its physical form, marked properly?

EWC had no classified hardware now. But if it were awarded the follow-on contract that would all change. Harold was eager for the new responsibilities that



possessing classified hardware would bring. As for documents, Harold had personally checked the markings on each one at EWC. Check.

2. Is all classified material marked to show the name and address of the facility responsible for its preparation and the date of preparation?

Yes.

3. Are overall markings conspicuously marked?

Yes.

4. Are portions of classified documents properly marked?

Yes.

5. Are all additional markings applied as required?

Yes.

Items 6 and 7. did not apply. EWC had no special types of classified material or unclassified compilations.

8. Are downgrading/declassification notations properly completed?

Yes. Always.


Item 9, regarding the distribution of upgraded classified material, did not apply to EWC.

Harold's face reddened when he came to the next element. Shades of December V Would he ever not recall that day whenever he came to



1. Is classified information properly prepared for transmission outside the facility?


Harold had done a lot of soul-searching over the mix-up with the packages on December 1. What could he have done to prevent the incident at the airport with Bascom? Was there something wrong with the SPP? Obviously, with Kate's slipping the calculator in the ACME package, the transmission had not been "properly prepared." And then Bascom's picking up the wrong package! No. He did not think revising the SPP was the answer. For now, Harold would not change it. He had counseled Kate and she really did seem to be making an effort. And Bascom's ordeal had had a profound effect on him too. Harold decided that more emphasis on security education was probably the answer. He would do all he could to reinforce and nurture Kate's and Bascom's new sense of security awareness.



Yes.

3. Is a suspense system established to track transmitted documents until the signed receipt is returned?

"Zelda, has the receipt for the ACME transmission come in yet?"



"Not yet. But we just sent it out last week." She showed Harold EWC's copy of the receipt (not required) and the document record.

"O.K."

4. Are procedures established for proper receipt and Inspection of classified transmittals and are returned receipts retained for two years?

The team of Milo Mertz and Zelda Hobbs was unsurpassed, he thought, in their strict adherence to procedures for receiving classified material. He had dropped in on both of them many times and neither had ever missed a step. EWC retained returned receipts for two years.

5. Are authorized methods used to transmit classified outside the facility?

Yes. Usually U.S. Mail. EWC had a facsimile machine but it was not approved for classified transmission. Harold had posted a warning notice over the machine to that effect. Harley Sanders had said that EWC's other controls were adequate but the notice was a good idea too.

Harold had been reading about the STU-III, a secure telephone system developed by the National Security Agency for classified transmission. Lots of contractors were using it. He decided that if and when EWC were awarded the follow-on, he would try to get one.

6. Is the facility clearance and safeguarding capability of the receiving facility determined prior to transmission of classified?

Yes. He had checked on ACME before transmitting Buzz's report.

7. Are Couriers, Handcarriers, and Escorts properly briefed?

EWC did not use couriers or escorts, but Bascom had been thoroughly briefed as a handcarrier.

8. Is handcarrying of classified material outside the facility properly authorized, inventoried, and safeguarded during transmission?

Harold went back to Zelda's office.

"Zelda, may I see the rest of the paperwork for Bascom's visit?"

Zelda had the inventory-approval record, the receipt from NESC, and the document record for Buzz's report in a neat stack on her desk. She knew that Harold would be returning to see them. She wondered why he didn't make just one trip to see all of the paperwork he needed to check.

By Bascom's account he had placed the case with the report for NESC on his lap when he took his seat on the airplane and he kept it there all the way to Washington, D.C. He had held onto it with both hands. Constant, vise-like surveillance.

"Thanks, Zelda."

9. Is handcarrying aboard commercial aircraft accomplished in accordance with required procedures?



It seemed to Harold that the Handbook was nagging him about the calculator incident. Yes, they had followed procedures. And yes, despite the procedures, the slip-up had happened.

Items 10 through 12 covered classified shipments by commercial carrier. EWC had not used a commercial carrier in years, and no one had sent any classified material to EWC by commercial carrier for some time. Harold was glad to move on to

N. Classified Material Controls.

1. Do contractor employees understand their safeguarding responsibilities?

Certainly Zelda, Buzz, and Bascom did. And with Kate the challenge was not her lack of understanding, but getting her to adhere to the established procedures for carrying out her responsibilities.

2. Is the contractor's information management system capable of facilitating the <u>retrieval</u> and <u>disposition</u> of classified material as required?

EWC had so little classified information on hand, that locating a specific document almost immediately posed no problem.

3. Are external receipt and dispatch records maintained as required?

Harold asked Zelda for all of the classified document receipt and dispatch records. Then he compared them with the documents in the GSA-approved container. Everything agreed. EWC retained all of its classified document records for two years at least.

Items 4 and 5 concerned TOP SECRET information and EWC had none.

6. Is all classified material received at the contractor facility and delivered directly to designated personnel?

Yes. Milo received the material at EWC and took it to Zelda.

Item 7 concerned TOP SECRET information and did not apply to EWC.


8. Does the contractor maintain a system of controls to deter or detect unauthorized introduction or removal of classified from the facility?

As Harold had noted earlier, Harley Sanders had worked with Harold to set up an excellent spot-check system.

9. Do contractor employees promptly report the loss, compromise, or suspected compromise of classified to the FSO?

Harley Sanders had approved the reporting procedures long ago. EWC had never had anything unfortunate happen to its classified information, though it had been a close call on December 1. He had not written up Kate or anyone else for a security violation for that day's mishaps, but he had taken action and he was prepared to go further in the future, if necessary.

10. Are procedures adequate to protect classified during emergencies?



Yes. EWC's SPP, which Harold had decided to retain, covered emergencies thoroughly.

11. Are security checks conducted at the end of each working day to ensure proper storage of classified materials?

Yes. As Harold had noted earlier, Zelda always checked to see that all classified material was stored in the GSA approved cabinet, then locked the cabinet. Harold double-checked that all classified material was secured.

O. Controlled Access Areas did not apply, but probably would if EWC were awarded the follow-on contract. So Harold skipped to

P. Disposition

1. Is a program established to review classified holdings on a recurring basis for the purpose of reduction?

Harold checked with Buzz every two months to see whether any classified documents could be destroyed. And Harold checked each reproduction request to see that there was a date for destroying the copies, at least a tentative one.

3. Is retention authority requested as required?

EWC had not as yet begun, let alone come to the end of, a 2-year retention period. But in the past EWC had always requested retention authority when it was appropriate. Retention requests had always requested and justified retention authority, identified the classified documents, and indicated the period of time retention was necessary. EWC's requests had always been approved.

4. Is classified material destroyed as soon as possible after it has served its purpose?

Yes. Harold noted that the classified documents that Buzz had identified were destroyed promptly.

5. Does the contractor employ an effective method of destruction?

EWC destroys its classified material by shredding it. Harley Sanders had looked at EWC's well-oiled crosscut shredder during the past security review and said it was fine.

6. Is classified material destroyed by appropriately cleared contractor employees?

Zelda was appropriately cleared and so was Kate, who would serve as Zelda's back-up now that she knew how to operate the shredder.

Item 7 was about destruction records for TOP SECRET material and did not apply to EWC.

8. Is classified waste properly safeguarded until its timely destruction?

Yes.

Harold knew the end was in sight when he came to

Q. Reproduction.

1. Does the facility's reproduction control system keep reproduction of classified material to a minimum?

Harold's reproduction control system had several features, none of them specifically required by the NISPOM. Harold used reproduction request forms to keep the number of copies to a minimum. Also, all of EWC's "unclassified" copying machines had warning notices, and the soon-to-be-replaced machine used for classified reproduction was located in Zelda's office. Instructions for the copier's use were posted above it. All of the employees authorized to use it were properly cleared, authorized, and knowledgeable.

Zelda always closed her door when she or someone else (Harold, Buzz, Kate, or Bascom) was going to use the "classified copier." Three copies of a blank sheet were always made after classified copying. The insides of the machine were always checked. All classified waste was collected and stored in her GSA-cabinet until destroyed.

Item 2 was answered by his answer to item 1.

3. Is reproduction authorization obtained as required?

None of the SECRET material that EWC possessed was specifically prohibited for reproduction (marked "REPRODUCTION REQUIRES APPROVAL OF ORIGINATING AGENCY OR HIGHER GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY"). So EWC never had to request reproduction authority.

4. Are reproductions of classified material reviewed to ensure that the markings are proper and legible?

Originals were always checked to see that they were thoroughly and accurately marked before reproduction, and copies were checked to see that all of the markings had been reproduced clearly.

5. Is a record of reproduction maintained for accountable material and is it retained as required?

EWC had no TOP SECRET, COSMIC TOP SECRET, or CRYPTO materials.

Harold skipped to

R. Classified Meetings.

There hadn't been any for a long, long time.

And the rest of the sections - S. Consultants, T. Automated Information Systems, U. COMSEC/CRYPTO, V. International Operations, W. OPSEC, and X. Special Access Programs - did not apply to EWC.

Harold went to his office and jotted down his findings. Apart from the calculator incident, he was pleased. EWC's security program worked well. He made an appointment to see J. Digby Wilbersnoot that afternoon.

"Come in, Hal. Come right on in," Mr. Wilbersnoot said, shaking Harold's hand and guiding him to a deep leather chair.

Mr. Wilbersnoot told some golf anecdotes, some stories about his grandchildren, discussed the likelihood of snow for Christmas, then said, "Well, Hal, how did the self-inspection go?"



"On the whole, just fine. Our paperwork is all there, and the whole system is working well, except for..." Harold paused.

"Some problem, Hal?"

"Just that package mix-up last week. The calculator incident."

"Oh, that." Everyone at EWC knew the story and Mr. Wilbersnoot had been one of the first to hear about it.

"Well, don't be too hard on yourself, Hal - or on anyone else for that matter. What happened isn't likely to ever happen again. I don't think even Harley Sanders will singe your toes for it."

Harold went over his notes in some detail with Mr. Wilbersnoot. He mentioned purchasing a STU-III if the follow-on contract came through, and Mr. Wilbersnoot agreed it would be a good idea.


Harold was about to leave when Mr. Wilbersnoot said, "By the way, Hal, I think I found a silver lining to one of those clouds of December 1. Maybe a gold lining even. I had Roger Puffer in marketing whip this up. I think it'll make a full-page ad that will pull in orders like solar gravity!"

Mr. Wilbersnoot held up a large, dramatic drawing of a muscular arm. The forearm had been cleverly detailed with the nomenclature of the QZ-12. The caption read "The QZ-12. Your Right Arm Widget."

Mr. Wilbersnoot grinned. "Won't Buzz be surprised!"

SUMMARY

Required self-inspections allow the FSO to review the entire security program of the facility. Self-inspections are conducted in accordance with risk management principles. It is suggested that you weigh the results of past government reviews and your contacts with your I.S. Rep in determining what needs to be examined. The Self-Inspection Handbook provides a guide for conducting self-inspections.





Complete the following exercises for review and practice.

Multiple-choice questions may have one or more correct choices.

	The facility nducted	self-inspection for a facility that possesses SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL documents should be
	() a. immediately preceding aperiodic government reviews.
	() b. once per month.
	() c. at intervals consistent with risk management principles.
	() d. every six months.
2.	A self-inspe	ection for a facility that possesses SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL information should cover
	() a. all elements listed in the Self-Inspection Handbook.
	() b. elements A through R of the Self-Inspection Handbook.
	() c. all elements listed in the Self-Inspection Handbook except those that refer solely to TOP SECRET information.
	() d. those elements that apply to the particular facility.
3.	Desirable fe	atures of a facility self-inspection include:
	() a. locating and reviewing applicable documents, forms, correspondence and other paperwork.
) b. talking to cleared personnel about any security problems you may have uncovered that relate to m and about any security difficulties they may be experiencing.
	() c. correcting any security problems you may have encounters.
	,) d. analyzing the causes of the security problems that were identified and, where possible, eliminating causes.



- 1. c. (p. 9-3) (**NISPOM**, 1-207b)
- 2. d (p. **9**-4)
- 3. a, b, c, and d. (pp. **9**-2-5)

Protecting Secret and Confidential Documents IS003.08

EXAM REFERENCE MATERIALS

Print this document and use during examination as reference material.

Use with Online Test Questions 24 - 38

Using the classification guidance provided below, determine what markings to assign to the report. The report has blanks with numbers that correspond to the examination item numbers. For each numbered blank in the report, select the item response letter of the marking that should go in that blank. Record that letter for the item on your answer sheet. Items 24 – 38 follow the report.

13. SECURITY GUIDANCE. The security classification guidance needed for this classified effort is identified below. If any difficulty is encountered in applying this guidance or if any other contributing factor indicates a need for changes in this guidance, the contractor is authorized and encouraged to provide recommended changes; to challenge the guidance or the classification assigned to any information or material furnished or generated under this contract; and to submit any questions for interpretation of this guidance to the official identified below. Pending final decision, the information involved shall be handled and protected at the highest level of classification assigned or recommended. (Fill in as appropriate for the classified effort. Attach, or forward under separate correspondence, any documents/guidance/extracts referenced herein. Add additional pages as needed to provide complete CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE: -U 1. Sources 2. Unit Price -U 3. Frequency range (bandwidth) -U 4. Relative survivability a. Mobility -C Declassify 8 Jun 2009 -C b. Security -S c. Supportability d. Ease of Operation e. Adaptability f. Resistance to: -S Downgrade to C 1 Sep 2003 1) Blackout Declassify 7 Feb 2011 2) Gamma rays -S Downgrade to C 1 Apr 2002 Declassify 8 Jan 2010 -S Downgrade to C 1 Jun 2004 3) Electromagnetic pulses Declassify 1 Jun 2006 5. Overall ratings of units -S Downgrade to C 1 Oct 2005 Declassify 1 Aug 2012

24

Communications Reports 738 Bison Street Platte Rapids, Nebraska 68131

March 18, 1996

SUBJECT: Evaluation of BLOS Boxes 25

- 1. 26 You don't have to spend a lot to get a decent beyond line-of-sight (BLOS) box. BLOS boxes operate in the HF frequency range (from 3 to 30 MHz/sec.) and VHF frequency range (from 30 to 300 MHz/sec.). BLOS boxes, with their reliable low-beamed transmissions, were once the mainstay of battlefield communication, but were phased out when ground-to-ground communication via satellite came in.
- 2. 27 BLOS boxes cost anywhere from \$37.50 to over \$18,000, but there are many good ones in the \$400-\$600 range.
- 3. 28 Frequencies begin at 5 MHz/sec. (five models) and reach to a high of 285 (for the Clancy P-T801). The average bandwidth of the models is 238; at 280, the bandwidth of the Clancy P-T801 has the widest spread.

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4. 31 Figure 1 summarizes and depicts the information provided in the reports received and shows the overall ratings assigned to the units.

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Or 32 ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ Better												
Ridiculously Low-priced Models:												
\$50 37.50 60	76 75 71	4	3 2 3	3 2 3	① ③ ③	3	③ ② ④	2 2 3	② ② ②	② ② ④	10- 270 15- 260 15- 230	Has DILAP antenna. Has DC jack for tank adapter. According to the manufacturer, this model has been discontinued. Has speaker OFF switch. Has samma ray counter.
Abell M-6017 60 71 (4) (3) (3) (3) (1) (4) (3) (2) (4) 13- Has gamma ray counter. Mid-priced models:												
480 630 435 490 505	83 82 79 75 71	② ③ ④	3 3 3	33333	3 3 4 3 5		3 3 3 3	② ② ③ ③ ③	(2) (2) (3) (3) (4)	3 1 2 3 3	5- 285 10- 275 5- 250 20- 280 10- 215	Has graphic equalizer. Has carrying handle. Has extra bass boost. Has eaphone jack. Has blackout indicator. Has blackout indicator. Has location the second problem of the second problem. Has Polby Z noise reduction. Has HFVHF band switch.
Outrageously High-priced models:												
3,700 9,540 7,220 12,650 8,300 1,280	82 80 80 79 77 75	2 3 3 3 3 3	2 3 3 3 3	0000000	0 2 3 5 4 5	0 0 0 0 0	3333333	3 3 3 3 3 4	33333	3 3 3 3	10- 270 5- 260 5- 250 15- 200 10- 260 5- 280	Has auto-record feature. Has gamma ray simulator. Has ermine case, highly damped control knobs. Uses alkaline D-cell batteries Has automatic shus-off. Has satellite communication feature. Has ARG-4 twistch. Has all platinum circuitry. Has weak signal amplifier. Has lower beam than most Has "hill-skip" feature. Has nuclear device detonation detector. Has ARG-
	\$50 37.50 60 480 630 435 490 505 3,700 9,540 7,220 12,650 8,300 1,280	\$50 76 37.50 75 60 71 480 83 630 82 435 79 490 75 505 71 3,700 82 9,540 80 7,220 80 12,650 79 8,300 77 1,280 75	\$50 76 4 37.50 75 4 60 71 4 480 82 2 435 79 3 490 75 4 505 71 4 2 2 9.540 80 3 7.220 80 3 12,650 79 3 8,300 77 3	\$50 76 4 3 37.50 75 4 2 60 71 4 3 \$\frac{480}{50} 83 2 2 2 2 2 2 435 79 3 2 2 490 75 490 75 4 2 2 9,540 80 3 2 7,220 80 3 3 12,650 79 3 3 1,280 75 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3	\$50 76 4 3 3 3 3 5 60 71 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3	\$50 76 4 3 3 3 0 37.50 75 4 2 2 3 3 60 71 4 3 3 3 3 480 83 2 2 2 3 3 3 435 79 3 2 3 4 490 75 4 2 2 2 2 3 505 71 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3	\$50 76 4 3 3 3 0 0 0 3 3 6 0 75 4 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	\$50 76 4 2 2 3 3 1 2 490 75 4 3 3 3 3 1 4 1 2 490 75 71 4 3 3 3 3 3 1 4 1 2 490 75 71 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 4 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 1 4 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3	\$50	\$50 76 4 3 3 1 1 3 2 2 2 3 50 75 4 3 3 3 1 1 3 2 2 2 2 5 505 71 4 3 3 3 3 1 4 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2	\$50	\$50

Figure 1. 33 Comparison Rating of BLOS Booxes

30

- 5. <u>35</u> The overall ratings reflect the estimated survivability of the models and include both non-resistance and resistance categories.
- a. <u>36</u> In the non-resistance categories, the Desta LRS-20 stood out with its unsurpassed ease of operation and supportability together with its above-average mobility, security, versatility, and systems adaptability.
- b. <u>37</u> In the resistance categories (blackout, gamma rays, and electromagnetic pulses) the best performer was the Schutrumpf JX-11. With its overall rating of 82 and its mid-range price of \$630, the Schutrumpf model offers exceptional quality and is the best choice for vital communication operations.
- c. 38 For less demanding applications, the Matini R-9712, despite its relatively poor mobility, offers excellent value at a mere \$50. A Best Buy!

Helga M. Hertz, Head Radio Evaluation Division